摘要: |
基于同步网络假设的拜占庭容错协议可容忍多达1/2的拜占庭节点数。Sync HotStuff是一个极其简单且直观的同步拜占庭容错协议,由稳定状态和视图更换两个子协议组成。在稳定状态下,诚实节点能以固定速率提出区块且该区块能在短时间内被确认。当主节点为拜占庭节点时其他节点将执行视图更换协议保证系统的进展。但若敌手控制多达1/2的拜占庭节点在当选主节点期间级联作恶则会严重影响系统的性能。本文首先定义了一种新的性能评估框架来定量分析Sync HotStuff的性能。然后提出了Sync HotStuff可能面临的两种拖延攻击场景,并分析了它们对Sync HotStuff性能的影响。最后,提出了两种对策来阻止上述攻击。分析表明,当被敌手控制级联作恶的拜占庭节点数越多时,系统进展受到的影响愈发严重,而我们的改进效果也愈发凸显。 |
关键词: 同步网络假设 Sync HotStuff 拜占庭容错 拖延攻击 |
DOI:10.19363/J.cnki.cn10-1380/tn.2024.08.09 |
投稿时间:2022-11-25修订日期:2023-02-13 |
基金项目: |
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Optimization of Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Consensus Algorithm for Consortium Blockchain |
Xue Meihua, Xu Haixia
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(Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences) |
Abstract: |
Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols based on synchronous network assumptions can tolerate up to 1/2 the number of Byzantine nodes. Sync HotStuff is an extremely simple and intuitive synchronous byzantine fault-tolerant protocol consisting of two sub-protocols: steady state and view change. In the steady state, an honest leader node can pro-pose a block at a fixed rate and the block can be committed in a short time. When the leader node is a byzantine node other nodes will execute the view change protocol to ensure the progress of the system. However, if an adver-sary controls up to 1/2 of the byzantine nodes to cascade mischief during the election of the leader node the per-formance of the system is severely affected. This paper first defines a new performance evaluation framework to quantitatively analyze the performance of Sync HotStuff. Then, two delay attack scenarios that Sync HotStuff may face are proposed and their impact on Sync HotStuff performance is analyzed. Finally, two countermeasures are proposed to resist the above attacks. The analysis shows that the more the number of byzantine nodes that are ma-ligned by the adversary control cascade, the more severely the system progress is affected, and the more our im-provements become prominent. |
Key words: synchronous network assumptions Sync HotStuff byzantine fault tolerance delay attack |